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Abstract. Micropolis is a virtual city that is used for various studies, such as model-
ing and analyzing water networks. In this paper we model the various interdependen-
cies between three major infrastructures in Micropolis, the power system, the commu-
nication network and the water network, in order to study cascades effects between 
them. Specifically, we develop open hybrid automata models for the main compo-
nents of the three infrastructures and then composed them together based on their in-
terdependencies. 
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1 Introduction 
The normal operation of the three Micropolis infrastructure systems, i.e., water, power and 
communication, heavily depends on the various interdependencies that exist among them. 
For instance, the water and communication systems receive electricity from the power sys-
tem to feed the water pumps and the cell antennas, respectively, while the power and water 
systems rely on the communication system for data transmission for their monitoring and 
control. If interdependencies break due to failure in one system, there will be a disruption to 
the normal operation of the other systems as well. Thus, it is important to study interde-
pendencies and develop models to analyze their cascading effects. 
To facilitate the identification, understanding, and analysis of interdependencies, we usually 
classify them based on their characteristics into the following four principal types [1]:  (a) 
physical, if the operations of one infrastructure depends on the physical output(s) of the 
other and vice versa, (b) cyber, if there is information/signal transmission between different 
infrastructures, (c) geographic, if components of different infrastructures are in close spatial 
proximity, and (d) logical, due to any other mechanism (e.g., various policy, legal, or regu-
latory regimes) that can link logically two or more infrastructures. Interdependencies are 
bidirectional relationships while dependencies are unidirectional relationships. When mul-
tiple infrastructures are connected as “system of systems” and their individual components 
are considered, interdependencies are the result of multiple dependencies between the com-
ponents of different infrastructures. These are often called external dependencies and they 
can be the same type as interdependencies i.e., physical, cyber, geographic, or logical, but 
just unidirectional. There are also internal dependencies, which are the connections be-
tween components inside the same infrastructure, for instance the connection inside the 
water infrastructure between a pump and a tank is an internal dependency. 
2 Micropolis main Components and Interdependencies 
For the city of Micropolis the main components of the three systems and their internal and 
external dependencies are shown in Figure . Specifically, the following components are 
considered: for the power system (1) the substation that supplies power to Micropolis and 
(2) the SCADA that remotely monitors and controls the substation; for the communication 
system (3) the network that consists of a number of microcell antennas; and lastly for the 
water system (4) the tank that supplies water to Micropolis and (5) the pump to which the 
tank is dependent for water, thus there is an internal dependency between the two. As ex-
ternal dependencies among the components three types are considered: (i) the physical 
dependencies of the pump and the network on the substation for power supply; (ii) the 
cyber dependencies of all the components on the network, i.e., the communication links to 
the substation, the SCADA, the pump and the tank; and (iii) the logical dependencies such 
as the power and water demands for the substation and the tank, respectively. Although 
there are geographic interdependencies between all the components, due to the close spatial 
proximity between them (Micropolis is a small town), we do not consider them in this work 
since they usually have an effect during intentional attacks or natural disasters (e.g., explo-
sions, floods, and earthquakes) and given the size of Micropolis such events would affect 
all the components at once without any cascading effects between them. 
 
Figure 1 Overview of Micropolis main infrastructures components and their dependencies. 
3 Open Hybrid Automata Modeling 
To model the main components of Micropolis and the dependencies between them in order 
to study possible cascading effects we use open hybrid automata as proposed in [2] which 
the reader is encouraged to review for more information. The open hybrid automata are 
used as models for hybrid systems, i.e., systems with both continuous and discrete behav-
iors such as critical infrastructures. For instance in a water system the start and stop of a 
pump is discrete while the flow of water is continuous. With open hybrid automata it is 
possible to model the behavior of each critical infrastructure component at the necessary 
level of abstraction, i.e., how the component will behave in case it fails or if there is no 
power supply or communication available. The dependencies among the components on the 
other hand, are represented by the connections between the inputs and the outputs of the 
various open hybrid automata models. Formally, connecting the inputs and the outputs of 
two or more open hybrid automata is called composition, and the result is another open 
hybrid automaton bigger and more complex that has the remaining inputs and outputs. The 
new open hybrid automaton is often referred to as the composition model and consists of all 
the open hybrid automata running in parallel. The composition model is the one that can be 
simulated for various scenarios where component(s) set to fail at specific time(s) and ob-
serve the cascading effects to the other components. 
 
Table 1 Models variables descriptions 
Substation 
𝑥𝑥"#  Timer (state) 𝑝𝑝%  Power Measurement (output) 
𝑠𝑠'(  Switch Signal from SCADA (input) 𝑃𝑃*+%  Power Limit (constant) 
𝑝𝑝,  Power Demand (input) 𝑇𝑇. Safety Period (constant) 
𝑝𝑝. Power Supply (output) 𝜀𝜀 White Noise (random variable) 
SCADA 
𝑥𝑥"0  Timer (state) 𝑠𝑠'(  Switch Control Signal (output) 
𝑝𝑝%  Substation Power Measur. (input) 𝑇𝑇,  Transmission Delay Time (constant) 
𝑠𝑠12  SCADA Operator Control (input) 𝑇𝑇. Safety Time (constant) 
Network 
𝑥𝑥"3#0  Timer for UPS reserve (state) 𝜙𝜙5 Fault Trigger (Input) 
𝑠𝑠67[9,;,<] Signals values of Substation, 
SCADA, and Tank, that pass and 
delayed through the network (input 
and output) 
𝑝𝑝5,  Instant Network Power Demand (out-
put) 
𝑇𝑇67[9,;,<] Transmission Delay for each 𝑠𝑠67[9,;,<] 
(constant) 
𝑝𝑝5. Instant Power Supply (input) 𝑃𝑃5 Network Working Power (constant) 
Tank 
𝑥𝑥>  Water Volume (state) 𝑣𝑣"@56  Instant Tank Water Volume (output) 
𝑤𝑤,  Water Demand (input) 𝑉𝑉C Initial Tank Water Volume (constant) 
𝑤𝑤. Water Supply (input) 𝑉𝑉%@D  Tank Maximum Volume (constant) 
Pump 
𝑥𝑥" Timer for Pump Operation (state) 𝑉𝑉"E  Staring Pump Volume Threshold (con-
stant) 𝑣𝑣"@56  Tank Water Volume Measurm. 
(input) 
𝑝𝑝F. Instant Power Supply (input) 𝑇𝑇GHH  Pump Min Resting Period  (constant) 
𝜙𝜙F Fault Trigger (Input) 𝑇𝑇G5 Pump Max Working Period  (constant) 
𝑤𝑤. Water Supply (output) 𝑊𝑊@>J Average Water Supply (constant) 
𝑝𝑝F,  Instant Power Demand (output) 𝑃𝑃F Pump Working Power (constant) 
𝑉𝑉%@D  Tank Maximum Volume (constant)   
In the next subsections the open hybrid automata models for the main components of Mi-
cropolis are presented and then the composition model is derived based on the dependen-
cies among them (see Figure ). The open hybrid automata models for the power substation, 
SCADA, are similar with those presented in [2], with minor modifications mostly to the 
variables names to make them less generic and more relevant to each infrastructure compo-
nent. Descriptions for each model variables are summarized in Table 1. 
3.1 Power Distribution Network (PDN) Components - Substation and SCADA 
The open hybrid automaton model for the Power Substation is shown in Figure  and is the 
same as the one in [2]. The model consists of two discrete states that represent the behavior 
of the substation i.e., Supply Power or Switch Off. When in Supply Power state the output 
𝑝𝑝. = 𝑝𝑝, (power supply to Micropolis equals to the power demand) and when in the Switch 
Off state the output 𝑝𝑝. = 0, also 𝑝𝑝%, that denotes the power measurements, changes accord-
ingly. The transitions between the two discrete are represented by the guards. For instance, 
the transition from the Supply Power to the Switch Off state will occur either if its request-
ed remotely from the SCADA (𝑠𝑠'( = 1) or due to safety reasons when the power demand 
is larger than the limit of the substation (𝑝𝑝, ≥ 𝑃𝑃*+%).  More detailed explanation for the 
model can be found in [2]. 
 
 
Figure 2 Power substation open hybrid automaton model. 
The open hybrid automaton model for the SCADA is shown in Figure . The model is also 
the same as the one in [2] and represents the SCADA behavior according to the power 
measurements input (𝑝𝑝%) and the operator input (𝑠𝑠12). The SCADA model will be at the 
Closed state if the substation is in the Supply Power state, representing the state of the 
switches at the substation, or at the Open state if the substation is in the Switch Off state or 
the operator decides to remotely cut the power for maintenance. In case of fault at the net-
work it will go to the Conn. Down state. The discrete transitions are determined by the two 
inputs (𝑝𝑝%, 𝑠𝑠12) and also by the continuous state 𝑥𝑥"0 that acts as a timer while in the Close 
and Open states. 
 
 
Figure 3 Power SCADA open hybrid automaton model. 
3.2 Communication Network (CN) Component  
The open hybrid automaton model for the Network is shown in Figure . The model is an 
extension of the work [2] with the addition of an extra signal input (𝑠𝑠<) that represents the 
communication between the water tank and the pump. The model consists of three discrete 
states that denote the behavior of the network. In the Healthy state the network operates 
normally providing communication services to Micropolis. In case of a power cut, where 
the power is not enough to feed the antennas (𝑝𝑝5. < 𝑃𝑃5) they will switch to UPS, thus the 
model transitions to the UPS usage state. However, the UPS can last for only a certain 
amount of time and this is what the continuous state 𝑥𝑥"3#0 is counting. Once it reaches the 
limit (𝑥𝑥"3#0 ≥ 𝑇𝑇PF.) the network will stop operating and this is represented in the model by 
transitioning to the Net Down state. Transition to the Net Down state is also triggered in 
case of a technical fault in the network which is denoted with the input 𝜙𝜙5. More detailed 
explanation for the model can be found in [2]. 
 
 
Figure 4 Network open hybrid automaton model 
3.3 Water Distribution Network (WDN) Components - Tank and Pump 
The tank receives and stores water from the pump and supplies Micropolis based on the 
demand. This has to be controlled accordingly since too much water from the pump can 
overflow the tank while less water can drain it. The tank open hybrid automaton model is 
shown in Figure . The continuous state 𝑥𝑥> denotes the volume of the tank that changes ac-
cording to 𝑥𝑥> = 𝑤𝑤. − 𝑤𝑤,, where 𝑤𝑤. denotes the water supply rate from the pump, and 𝑤𝑤, 
the water demand rate of consumers. The discrete states of the model are determined by the 
tank volume. For instance, the model will be at the “Healthy” state while 0 < 𝑥𝑥> ≤ 𝑉𝑉%@D, 
where 𝑉𝑉%@Dis the tank's maximum volume, and it will transition to either the Drained state 
if 𝑥𝑥> ≤ 0  or to the Overflow state if 𝑥𝑥> > 𝑉𝑉%@D . The model will return back to the 
“Healthy” state if the water supply becomes larger than the demand 𝑤𝑤. > 𝑤𝑤, and is in the 
Drained state, or if the water demand becomes larger than the supply 𝑤𝑤, > 𝑤𝑤. and is in the 
Overflow state. The single output of the model 𝑣𝑣"@56 denotes the tank's volume measure-
ment depending on the state, and is transmitted to the pump through the network so that the 
pump can start and stop as described next. 
 
Figure 5 Tank open hybrid automaton model. 
The pump supplies Micropolis tank with water by receiving and comparing the tank vol-
ume measurement with some threshold, if the tank volume goes below the threshold value 
then the pump will start given that the substation provides the necessary power. There are 
also restrictions to the pump operation such as maximum working period and minimum 
resting period. The pump open hybrid automaton model is shown in Figure . The model has 
three discrete states: (i) the Pump Off when the pump is off, (ii) the Pump On when the 
pump is on and supplies the tank with water, and (iii) the Fault state when there is power 
cut, network issues, or technical fault that prevent the pump to operate normally. The dis-
crete transitions between the Pump Off and Pump On states are trigger by the input 𝑣𝑣"@56, 
that denotes the tank's volume measurement, and by the continuous state 𝑥𝑥", that acts as a 
timer counting the working and the resting period of the pump. Specifically, the transition 
from Pump Off to Pump On is triggered when the tank’s volume goes below the specified 
threshold 𝑉𝑉"E and also the pump’s resting period 𝑇𝑇GHH has expired, i.e. 𝑣𝑣"@56 < 𝑉𝑉"E ∧ 𝑥𝑥" ≥
𝑇𝑇GHH. The transition from the Pump On back to Pump Off state is triggered either when the 
tank's water volume reaches the maximum volume 𝑉𝑉%@D or if the maximum working period 
𝑇𝑇G5 of the pump has been reached, i.e. 𝑣𝑣"@56 ≥ 𝑉𝑉%@D ∨ 𝑥𝑥" > 𝑇𝑇G5. In case of one or more 
issues such as: less power supply than what is necessary (𝑝𝑝F. < 𝑃𝑃F ), network issues 
(𝑣𝑣"@56 = −1), or the pump suffers a technical fault (𝜙𝜙F = 1), the model will transition to 
the Fault state. Once the issue(s) is/are resolved it will transition to the Pump Off state and 
it will be ready to supply water to the tank accordingly. The two outputs of the model, 𝑤𝑤. 
that denotes the water supply by the pump and 𝑝𝑝F, that denotes the power demand of the 
pump, change values based on the discrete state of the model. In both Pump Off and Fault 
states 𝑤𝑤. = 0 and 𝑝𝑝F, = 0, while in the Pump On 𝑤𝑤. = 𝑊𝑊@>J and 𝑝𝑝F, = 𝑃𝑃F, where 𝑊𝑊@>J is 
the average water supply rate of the pump and 𝑃𝑃F the necessary pump power. 
 
 
Figure 6 Pump open hybrid automaton model. 
3.4 Composition Model 
The five open hybrid automata models are composed together as shown in Figure  creating 
the composition model, a larger model that includes the various dependencies between the 
components. As elaborated above, there are physical, cyber and logical external dependen-
cies between the components and internal dependency between the tank and the pump, that 
are all depicted in detail in Figure . In the composition the component models run in paral-
lel with the output of one model to become the input to the other, developing various feed-
back loops between them, which represent infrastructure interdependencies. For example, 
both the power substation and the SCADA use the network to transmit power measure-
ments and control signals between them, as depicted in Figure  with the necessary connec-
tions. The network is also depended on the substation model for power. These dependency 
connections create feedback loops between these three models, which subsequently form an 
interdependency between the power and the communication infrastructure. This allows the 
study of cascading effects between the various components by running simulation scenarios 
with the composition model as presented in the next section. 
 
 
Figure 7 Composition model 
4 Conclusions 
In this work we have develop open hybrid automata models of the main critical infrastruc-
tures for Micropolis virtual city, that can be used to study cascading faults. Specifically, the 
composition model, through several simulation scenarios, can determine under what condi-
tions a fault in one component can cascade to other components in other infrastructures due 
to the effects of interdependencies. 
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